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Purpose:  The purpose of the thesis is to examine if the Swedish Central Bank, the Riksbank, 
reacts to changes in asset prices and the strength of the currency when regulating 
the short term interest rate. The application of backward- and forward-looking 
Taylor rules will help us evaluate the outcome of the Riksbank’s inflation forecast. 
 
Method:  The thesis is based on the Taylor rule, augmented with the deviation of asset prices 
from its trend and the deviation of the TCW-index from its average, to examine 
if the variables are taken into consideration by the Riksbank. The models were 
regressed with OLS and TSLS, and the models differentiated by using current 
inflation against realized inflation one year ahead. 
 
Conclusion:  The results showed that none of the asset prices or currency strength was found 
significant, implying that the Riksbank does not react to changes in the augmented 
variables. The inflation- and GDP-gap was significant in all the backward-looking 
models, though not in any of the forward-looking models. Differences in the 
current and forecast-based models show that the Riksbank’s inflation forecast is 
insufficient. 
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1. Introduction 
In this chapter we will start by presenting the background to our thesis and then we will discuss the purpose. 
1.1 Background 
More than twenty years has passed since Sweden first introduced a floating exchange rate from 
having its currency fixed to the European currency unit ECU (Riksbanken 2011a). As Sweden 
transitioned, the Swedish central bank began using the repurchase agreement as the primary tool 
to regulate the monetary policy, with the intent to keep the inflation at a low and stable level without 
creating a greater fluctuation in the real economy (Palmqvist 2007). 
In 1993, John. B. Taylor published a paper, “Discretion versus policy rules in practice” which 
highlights how central banks can use the prime rate as an instrument to regulate the inflation via 
monetary policy. Since the introduction of the Taylor Rule, it has been modified several times and 
extended with more variables in attempt to strengthen the model. 
The Swedish central bank’s target is to keep the inflation at 2% with a margin of error of 
one percentage point.1 The repurchase rate has an effect on the lending rate i.e. the rate which 
banks borrow money from the central bank (e.g., see Fregert and Jonung 2010). By offering a low, 
or even a negative, rate the central bank stimulates the economy with the intent of increasing 
consumption. The inflation rate in Sweden is currently at 0.1% (Statistiska centralbyrån  2015) 
which is significantly lower than the target of 2 percent. On the 18th of February 2015 the Riksbank 
decided, for the first time in Swedish history, to lower the short term interest rate to a negative 
level in order to reach the inflation target of 2%. The Riksbank has, since February, lowered the 
rate further to a new record low level of -0.35% (Riksbanken 2015). According to the Riksbank 
(2011b) the value of the currency will be affected by a change in the interest rate. They further state 
that an increase in the interest rate will result in a strengthening of the currency, and the change in 
the currency’s exchange rate will affect the import and export (Riksbanken 2011c). The current 
negative rate should have depreciated the value of the Swedish krona and therefore affected the 
export and the real economy. This economic chain reaction suggests that it is important to consider 
the currency’s strength when regulating the rate. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine how asset prices and the strength of the Swedish 
currency affect the Riksbank’s interest rate decision. We are going to use backward- and forward-
looking Taylor models and augment them with additional variables, which take asset prices and the 
strength of the currency into consideration. Differences in real time models versus forecast-based 
                                                 
1 Generally, for goods and services measured by Consumer price index; the measurement of inflation that is 
commonly used by the official bank. 
 5 
will be examined to see how well the Central bank of Sweden have forecasted the inflation for a 
reasonable time ahead. According to Chadha, Sarno and Valente (2003) and Taylor (2001), small 
economies should consider using a variable that captures the currency exchange rate when setting 
the monetary policy, since they argue that the central banks might respond to a change in exchange 
rates. As Sweden’s export in 2014 was nearly 45 percent of GDP (SCB 2015), the effect on trade 
from monetary policy is relevant to the Swedish economy. We will use the Total Competitiveness 
Weights-index since it is a geometric index, a bundle which contains 21 different currencies, against 
the Swedish krona. The index is considering the import and exports to the countries in the bundle 
and is weighted subsequently. 
In addition, the fact that housing- and asset prices grew more rapidly than the consumer 
price index would indicate that these markets do not react to changes in the interest rate to the 
same extent as the consumer price index. Mishkin (2001) found that fluctuations of the asset market 
influence the aggregated economy, through its impact on the transmission mechanism. This makes 
it noteworthy to see if the Swedish Riksbank takes these aspects into consideration in their decision 
making, and to what extent. 
1.2 Previous research 
There exist a number of empirical studies if asset prices are targeted by the central banks; with 
various results, no conclusive results have been observed.  
Taylor (1993) outlines how the central bank can use a reaction function to control the inflation and 
economic output by changes in the nominal interest rate. The equation, known as the Taylor Rule, 
is generally accepted and applied within the economic community. It is a monetary policy rule 
focusing on long-term price stability through predictable actions by the official bank and therefore 
reduced uncertainty vis-à-vis a discretionary policy where the official bank take decisions from case-
to-case (Orphanides, 2007). The Taylor Rule has since then been modified to include a forecast of 
the inflation by Orphanides (2001), Clarida, Gali & Gertler (1998a), among others, to create a better 
reaction function for the central banks. 
 Fisher (1911) highlights a relationship between movement in asset prices and inflation. He 
argues that asset prices can be used to forecast the inflation. Several recent studies have been 
focused on the subject of whether asset prices should be considered in the monetary policy. For 
instance, Bernanke & Gertler (1999) and Hilberg & Hollmayr (2011) argue that asset prices should 
not be included in the monetary policy rule because of undesired side effects; however, Bernanke 
& Gertler (1999), and later Siklos, Werner & Bohl (2004), found that asset prices could be relevant 
indicators for forthcoming inflation. 
 6 
 Sutherland (2015) investigates whether the interest rate is affected by changes in the 
exchange rate and the price of houses and assets. He used the currency pair SEK/EUR with the 
motivation that Sweden exports a large amount of goods to the Eurozone and therefore it would 
be valid to take the exchange rate into account in the Riksbank’s monetary policy making. He did 
not find any evidence that the Swedish central bank reacted to deviations of asset- or house prices 
from their trend level, nor the exchange rate.  
 
2. Theory 
This chapter highlights the roll of the central bank in Sweden and how the central bank uses the interest rate as a 
tool to regulate the inflation; thereafter, both backward-looking and forward-looking Taylor rules will be presented. 
2.1 The roll of the central bank of Sweden 
The main purpose of the central bank of Sweden is to regulate the monetary policy in Sweden. 
Their principal instruments are the adjustment of 
the short-term interest rate (also known as the 
repurchase agreement), through altering the 
monetary base (Fregert & Jonung 2010). The 
Riksbank’s inflation target is to keep the inflation 
in Sweden at a stable level of 2 percent. The 
interest rate does not only affect the inflation but 
also affects the economic growth in the country.  
The effect that a change in the interest rate 
causes on inflation is known as the transmission 
mechanism. Figure 2.1 illustrates six important 
stages which the Riksbank are taking into account 
when trying to adjust the inflation level in Sweden. 
There are many processes to consider and every 
step of the chain reaction results in a lag between 
a change in the interest rate and the full effect of 
the alteration. Fregert & Jonung (2010) and 
Riksbanken (2011b) explain that the time between a change in the interest rate and the effect on 
the inflation is named the transmission mechanism and is considered to show an effect one to two 
years after the initial change. Further, Fregert & Jonung (2010) and Crockett (2000) argues that a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The Riksbank’s structure of the 
monetary policy in Sweden 
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change in the interest rate will not always have the desired outcome on the inflation. This is because 
of external disturbences, which can be somewhat troublesome and hence difficult to predict. The 
transmission mechanism contains of three different channels which are: the credit channel, the 
interest rate channel and the exchange rate channel. The Mundell-Fleming modell emphasises that 
the exchange rate channel have a greater impact on the inflation and GDP than the other two 
channels, since a change in the value of a currency will affect the import and export (see Fregert 
and Jonung 2010). 
2.1.1 The credit channel 
The central bank uses the credit channel to regulate the lending interest rate to banks. An increase 
in the lending rate will decrease the lending from banks, i.e. it will affect the banks customers 
willingness to take a loan. This will generally result in lower activity in the economy since potentiall 
lenders will postpone their investments (Riksbanken 2011b). 
2.1.2 The interest rate channel 
The centralbank uses the interest rate channel to regulate the household consumption by adjusting 
the interst rate to either make it attractive to save money or to consume. If the goal is to surpress 
consumption, the Central bank raises the interest rates to make it more appealing to save money 
(Riksbanken 2011b). 
2.1.3 The exchange rate channel 
The centralbank can use the exchange rate channel to regulate the inflow and the demand of capital 
to a country. If the central bank wants to increase the strenght of the currency, they need to make 
the currency attractive. An increase in the interest rate result in higher willingness of investing in 
the country’s assets rather than a third country. This will normally result in higher demand for the 
currency and implicitly, an appreciation of the currency itself. Furthermore, this will have an affect 
on the trade, import and export, since a change in the currency alter the attractiveness of the trade 
flows from the country. If the currency appreciates, the currency becomes more expensive which 
implies that the demand for domestic good will decrease since it becomes more expensive to 
consume abroad, hence the inflation will be surpressed (Riksbanken 2011b). Research conducted 
by Crockett (2000) highlights the importance of the the exchange rate channel and emphasises that 
it can have great effects in small economies, since a change in the price of the currency will affect 
the countrys trade. Further, the general theory (e.g see Fregert & Jonung 2010) describes that for a 
small economy the monetary policy is primarly exercised by changes in the exchange rate. Sweden 
is a small and open economy thus the exchange rate is the Riksbank’s primary monetary policy 
 8 
tool. Figure 2.2 illustrates the effects on the GDP when a small open economy uses expansive 
monetary policy, sustaining a floating exchange rate. When applying expansive monetary policy, 
the increase in the monetary base will shift the LM-curve1 downwards which will temporary 
decrease the interest rate. Further this will result in a depreciation of the currency, which will lead 
to an increase in net export and shift the IS-curve2 to the right until the LM-, IS- and foreign interest 
rate interects. As can be observed, this results in an increase in GDP and a new equlibrium. 
 
 
 
Taylor (1993) emphasized how a monetary policy can be conducted and pointed out two important 
target variables; the inflation and the GDP. This will be presented further in the next section. 
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2.2 Taylor rule 
The backward-looking Taylor rule – the standard Taylor rule – is based on historical data and the 
reaction function gives a historical relationship between the targeted and tangible inflation, the 
output gap and the interest rate. The relationship of the variables yields a short term approach to 
determine the level of the interest rate, as well as long term market stability through the inflation 
target. The model, described by Taylor (1993), are the following:  
 
𝒓∗𝒕 = 𝒑𝒕 + 𝟎, 𝟓(𝒑𝒕 − 𝟐) + 𝟎, 𝟓𝒚𝒕 + 𝟐   (2.1) 
where  
𝑟∗ is the optimal short term interest rate at time t 
𝑝𝑡  is the inflation rate 
𝑦𝑡  is the percent deviation of real GDP from the GDP target (GDP gap) at time t. 
𝑦= 100(Y - Y*)/Y*  where Y  is the real GDP and Y* is the real GDP linear trend (estimated by a 
Hodrick-Prescott-filter). 
 
Taylor suggest that the coefficient of the inflation gap(h) and the GDP gap(g) should be weighted 
equally at 0.51, giving the same response for inflation and GDP deviation in the reaction function. 
The inflation target was set at 2 percent, which is used in several countries (e.g. Sweden, USA). The 
term (𝑝𝑡-2) is the inflation deviation from its targeted level. Suppose the output gap and the 
inflation deviation would be zero, the optimal short run interest rate would be set at 2 percent plus 
the level of inflation2. In other terms, the real interest rate would be set at 4 percent if no 
discrepancy exists between the GDP trend and the inflation target. Later Taylor (1999) suggested 
that a coefficient for the inflation gap should be greater than one, renown as the Taylor principle. 
The purpose of the Taylor principle is to help the official bank to better react to fluctuation; a 
coefficient of 1 + h would better stabilize the macro economy (Troy & Leeper 2007). 
 
A problem for the policymakers, discussed by McCullum (1993), was the inability to observe the 
current GDP, and subsequently optimize with the actions available (tighten/not tighten). Critique 
was also aimed at the original rule for lacking a smooth, progressive change in the interest rate. 
The wish for a more subtle change of the interest rate was expressed by Bob Bernanke, the former 
head of the Federal Reserve: “But if we do agree with that inflation outlook, then at least based on 
                                                 
1 Taylor calibrated that parameters, set to 0.5, followed the U.S fund rate between 1987-1992 with a good fit (Taylor, 
1993). 
2 To obtain the inflation gap at zero, the inflation would by default be 2 percent. 
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this estimated rule our policy tightening should be slower and more gradual than suggested by 
historical relationships…” (FOMC, October 2003, p72). In other words, the forward-looking rule 
advised a smaller change, whilst the backward-looking rule suggested larger changes more rapidly. 
Forward-looking models use lagged interest rate on the right side; the coefficients are known as 
smoothing parameters. The lagged variable gives the interest rate a slower speed of adjustment and 
does not stipulate larger direct change, contrary the backward-looking rule, instead intermittently 
change the rate towards its desired level. This is named interest rate smoothing: a change in the 
interest rate is believed to have a delayed effect of one to two years and the lagged variables take 
these effects in to consideration. 
 A forward-looking Taylor (1999) rule can be expressed as: 
 
 𝒓∗𝒕 = 𝒑𝒕 + 𝟎, 𝟓(𝑬[𝒑𝒕+𝒋 ∣ 𝛀𝒕] − 𝟐) + 𝟎, 𝟓𝑬[𝒚𝒕+𝒋 ∣ 𝛀𝒕] + 𝟐  (2.2) 
 
A forward-looking model for the central bank will be based on expected inflation deviation from 
target 𝑬[(𝝅𝒕+𝟒 − 𝝅
∗) ∣ 𝛀𝒕], and the expected GDP gap 𝑬[𝜸𝒕 ∣ 𝛀𝒕]. 𝛀𝐭 is the information set 
available to the Riksbank at time t. 
The difference between the backward- and forward-looking rules is the marginal change in 
the short-term interest rate and the greater weight put on the inflation expectancies by the forward-
looking rule (FOMC, October 2003, p72). The Federal Open Market Committee (1997) found 
through simulations that it is more costly to not tighten (lower the rate/unchanged rate) when the 
real situation required a tighter policy than to tighten (increase the rate) when the actual response 
would be not to tighten. Therefore, including lagged interest rate is more forgiving than the original 
rule if the central bank’s decision on the interest rate is erroneous. 
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2.3 The Riksbank’s two percent target and forecasted inflation 
The Riksbank’s target of two percent has not been reached with any greater success. 
The National institute of economic research (Konjunkturinstitutet, 2013) published a rapport on 
how the Riksbank has systematically misjudged the prediction of inflation. On average, the 
Riksbank’s inflation forecast has been overestimated with approximately one percent points on a 
two year term. The poorly predicted inflation, and the changes in the interest rate that follows, will 
cause further pressure on the actual inflation. Aggregated, this will push the inflation down and not 
allow it to recover to the desired level. 
 
3. Data and Method 
This chapter starts with a brief presentation of the variables used in our modified Taylor model, the chapter continues 
with presenting the execution of the model. 
3.1 Discussion of variables  
The foundation of the empirical models constructed in this paper is based on the Taylor rule. We 
will extend the Taylor rule model by adding additional dependent variables that we believe can have 
an effect on the interest rate, and widen the central bank’s information set when determining the 
interest rate. The key findings in Taylors (1993) paper are that the interest rate tends to be driven 
by two main factors, the inflation and the difference between GDP and potential GDP. Further 
the Taylor model emphasizes that the difference between actual inflation and the inflation target 
together with the GDP gap is a function of the interest rate, set by the central bank. We collected 
data from the first quarter in 1995 to the third quarter in 2015. Augmented Dickey Fuller unit root 
tests were performed on all the variables to check the data for stationarity1. The test indicated non-
stationary series on OmxSpi, housing prices, TCW-index and commodities. The variables were 
transformed to stationary by taking the difference of the variables. 
Inflation 
The data of the inflation were collected from Statistiska Centralbyrån in quarterly form. The 
inflation gap is obtained by taking the difference of the inflation and its targeted level (for The 
Riksbank; 2 percent). The data for the interest rate were collected from the Riksbank in quarterly 
form. 
                                                 
1 Tests attached in appendix; A 
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GDP gap 
The GDP gap, also known as the output gap, is the difference between real GDP and potential 
GDP. The percentage changes in real GDP were collected from OECD, in quarterly data. By using 
a Hodrick–Prescott filter on the real GDP we were able to calculate the potential GDP. The 
Hodrick–Prescott filter is used for estimating trends by smoothing the time series data and is 
proposed in the relevant literature (Taylor 1999). This approximation of trends will be used on the 
subsequent variables. It is suggested in Hodrick & Prescott (1980) that the smoothing parameter 
should be set to λ=1600 for quarterly data, and were applied to the concerned variables. 
Asset prices and exchange rate  
Stock prices 
OmxSpi is an all share-index containing all the stocks that are listed on the Stockholm stock 
exchange. The OmxSpi data were collected from NASDAQ OMX Nordic in daily observations. 
The data were recalculated to quarterly form by taking an average of the three months included in 
each quarter. The unit root test indicated that the data was non-stationary; the solution to this 
problem was to take the 1st difference in the data. 
House prices 
Housing prices represent the average price for permanent houses in Sweden. The house prices 
were collected from Statistiska Centralbyrån in quarterly data. The unit root test indicated that the 
data was non-stationary; the solution to this problem was to take the 2st difference in the data. 
Commodity prices 
The commodities index used is an all commodity price index. The data was collected from the 
International Monetary Fund in monthly form; recalculated the data to get it in to quarterly form 
by taking an average of the three months. The unit root test indicated that the data was non-
stationary and also here, the 1st difference of the series made it stationary. 
TCW-index 
The TCW-index consists of different currencies, weighted with respect to size of the trade to the 
third part country. The quarterly data for the Total Competitiveness Weights-index were collected 
from the Riksbank. 
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3.2 Regressions 
To make the Taylor reaction function possible to regress, it must be transformed. Thus, the model 
in regression form based on the original Taylor rule, is given by: 
 
𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝝅(𝝅𝒕 − 𝝅
∗) + 𝜷𝜸𝜸𝒕 + 𝜺𝒕    (3.1) 
 
Where i is the interest rate at time t, α is an intercept, π is the current inflation at time t, π* is the 
inflation target. Combined, (𝜋𝑡-π*) represent the current inflation deviation from its targeted two 
percent, also known as the inflation gap. The GDP-gap is represented by γ and 𝜀𝑡 is the error term. 
 
Regressing the model with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) gives a linear relationship between the 
dependent and non-dependent variables. The residuals from this regression display autocorrelation, 
which is confirmed by a Breusch-Godfrey LM test. 
Later studies on the Taylor rule suggest that previous periods of the interest rate should be 
incorporated in the equation to capture the interest smoothing factor from previous lagged effects 
of the short-term interest rate. Bob Bernanke expressed that in both the backward- and the 
forward-looking rule, lagged interest rate is sufficient in the equation as an error correction term 
(FOMC, Oct 2003, p71). Thus, variables of lagged interest rate can be incorporated in the models, 
not just in the forecast-based model. By adding two variables of lagged interest rate, the null 
hypothesis of the Breusch-Godfrey LM test was rejected and our problem with the correlated 
residuals was fixed. With the correction for autocorrelation, we end up with the following model: 
 
𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝝅(𝝅𝒕 − 𝝅
∗) + 𝜷𝜸𝜸𝒕 + 𝝆𝟏𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝝆𝟐𝒊𝒕−𝟐 + 𝜺𝒕  (3.2) 
 
Where 𝑖𝑡−1,2 is the interest rate lagged one or two periods back and 𝜌1,2 is the smoothing 
parameter. 
3.2.1 Forward-looking Taylor rule 
The Riksbank’s change of the short-term interest rate will not have a direct effect on the market 
and the policy makers cannot observe numerous variables in the time of the decision making, 
therefore a forward-looking model would be more viable to use. Furthermore, Svensson (1997), 
Batini & Haldane (1999) and the general theory (e.g. in Fregert & Jonung 2010) argues that the 
Taylor rule should be forecast-based as several central bank’s conduct their policy with the help of 
forecast-based models. Batini & Haldane (1999) reasons that inflation forecast is to be approached 
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by 𝜋𝑡+𝑗 . The value of j implies the degree of smoothing of the interest rate by the number of 
periods before inflation reach its targeted level. The choice of j is based on the optimal forecast 
horizons in Batini & Haldane (1999), who advocate a number of j between three to six quarters. 
Our choice of j is four quarters, supported by Batini & Haldane as well as similar regressions 
(Sutherland 2015; Clarida et al 1998b). 
The forward-looking Taylor rule can be written in this way:  
 
𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝝅(𝝅𝒕+𝟒 − 𝝅
∗) + 𝜷𝜸𝜸𝒕 +  𝝆𝟏𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝝆𝟐𝒊𝒕−𝟐 + 𝜺𝒕   (3.3) 
 
We do observe two problems with regressing model (3.3). Models, just like this one, are using 
realized inflation for j periods ahead; commonly used in relevant literature such as Bernanke & 
Gertler (1999) and Cecchetti, Genberg & Wadhwani (2002). This choice is based on the assumption 
that the forecast model is unbiased and that the Central bank can predict the behavior of future 
inflation without any significant inaccuracies. 
Further, the forecast model for the central bank will be based on expected inflation deviation from 
target and the expected GDP gap, written as 𝑬[(𝝅𝒕+𝟒 − 𝝅
∗) ∣ 𝛀𝒕] and 𝑬[𝜸𝒕 ∣ 𝛀𝒕] where E is the 
expected value of the inflation gap and the GDP gap. In addition, 𝜴𝒕 is the information available 
to the Riksbank at time t. The inflation deviation and output gap are conditional on the information, 
hence highly uncertain. 
The expectations cannot be regressed and will therefore be captured as a linear combination 
in the error term, causing endogeneity between the regressors and the error term. A regular OLS-
estimation will be inconsistent and another type of method that allows instruments to cope with 
the correlations must be used. By using instrument variables, the endogeneity problem could be 
solved if the instruments are uncorrelated with the dependent variable, but correlated with the 
independent endogenous variables. In this paper we will use Two-stage least squares (TSLS). 
Literature suggests that usage of lagged inflation- and GDP gap is sufficient as instruments 
(Bernanke & Gertler 1999; Clarida et al 1998b). Clarida et al (1998b) also propose to use a world 
commodity index and its lags of one to four periods as instruments. 
 
3.2.2 The augmented model 
We add our variables of interest to examine if they affect the interest rate, i.e. if the Riksbank has 
taken these variables into consideration when determining the short term interest rate. Our added 
terms for asset prices (a and h) is expressed in terms of the changes in the previous period deviation 
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from its trend level, based on similar studies from Cecchetti et al (2002) and Bernanke & Gertler 
(1999). The exchange rate is modeled in a similar way, through lagged deviation from its average. 
The augmented model with our variables: 
 
𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝝅(𝝅𝒕+𝟒 − 𝝅
∗) + 𝜷𝜸𝜸𝒕 +  𝝆𝟏𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝝆𝟐𝒊𝒕−𝟐 + 𝜷𝒂(𝒂𝒕−𝟏 − ?̂?) +  𝜷𝒉(𝒉𝒕−𝟏 − ?̂?) +
𝜷𝒆(𝒆𝒕−𝟏 − ?̅?) +  𝜺𝒕          (3.4) 
 
Where (𝒂𝒕−𝟏 − ?̂?) is the lagged deviation of asset prices from its trend level, (𝒉𝒕−𝟏 − ?̂?) is the 
lagged deviation of house prices from its trend level and (𝒆𝒕−𝟏 − ?̅?) is the lagged deviation of the 
TCW-Index from the periods average value. 
As instruments for asset prices and the competitive exchange rate index, the terms as its 
own will function as instruments. This is valid since the observed deviation of the variable in period 
t-1 will not be correlated with the error term in period t, i.e. the covariance of the lagged deviations 
and 𝜺𝒕 is zero. 
 
We will initially regress and compare model (3.2) and (3.3) with OLS to see potential differences in 
the backward- and forward-looking models. We will then compare the augmented model (3.4) with 
a similar model, called model (3.4*).1 The model (3.4*) is an augmented model of (3.2); we use the 
backward-looking Taylor rule and add our variables of interest.  Model (3.4) and (3.4*) will be 
estimated with OLS and later with TSLS. When using TSLS, the models are estimated with the 
aforementioned instruments (constant included). All models are estimated with HAC standard 
errors to correct for possible heteroscedasticity and/or autocorrelation 
  
                                                 
1 The model (3.4*) is given by:  𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝝅(𝝅𝒕 − 𝝅
∗) + 𝜷𝜸𝜸𝒕 + 𝝆𝟏𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝝆𝟐𝒊𝒕−𝟐 + 𝜷𝒂(𝒂𝒕−𝟏 − ?̂?) +
𝜷𝒉(𝒉𝒕−𝟏 − ?̂?) + 𝜷𝒆(𝒆𝒕−𝟏 − ?̅?) + 𝜺𝒕     
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4. Results & Analysis 
This section will present the outcome of our regressions and comment on the significance of the explanatory variables.  
4.1 Ordinary least square regressions 
Table 4.1 contains the results from the OLS regression of model (3.2) and (3.3). From the results 
we can observe that the inflation gap and the GDP gap are significant at a five percent level in the 
backward-looking model, though these significances cannot be observed when using a forward-
looking estimation. The lagged interest rates are, as expected, significant at a one percent level for 
both models. This is because of the causality between the dependent variable and its lags. 
 
Table 4.1: OLS 
Notes: (1) Standard errors given in parentheses; (2) * p< 0.05; (3) ** p< 0.01; (4) N is the number of 
observations 
 
As mentioned in the methodology part, a LM-test was performed that confirmed that we had 
problem with autocorrelation. By adding two lagged interest rate variables this issue was solved. It 
is noteworthy to mention that the 𝑅2 is affects by the lagged variables of the interest rate, giving 
the model an undeserved high explanatory power. When we observed the correlation between 
variables, it showed that the correlation value for the interest rate and its lags were high (>0.90)1. 
                                                 
1 See table B in appendix. 
Explanatory Variable Estimates 
(3.2) 
P-Value Estimates 
(3.3) 
P-Value 
𝜷𝝅   Inflation gap 0,0675* 
[0,0261] 
0.011 0,0303 
 [0,0266] 
0,258 
𝜷𝜸   GDP gap 0,1718* 
[0,0749] 
0.024 0,1471 
 [0,0800] 
0,070 
𝝆𝟏   𝑖𝑡−1 1,4559** 
[0.0692] 
0.000 1,5496** 
[0,0614] 
0,000 
𝝆𝟐   𝑖𝑡−2 -0,5078** 
[0.0668] 
0.000 -0,5935** 
[0,0622] 
0,000 
𝑵 81  77  
𝑹𝟐  0.979  0,976  
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This suggests that the model might suffer from multicollinearity, hence the high 𝑅2 (Kennedy 
2008). By deducting the lagged interest variables our problem with multicollinearity disappeared, 
but the model would suffer from autocorrelation.1 We continued including the two lagged interest 
rate variables in our model, and accept the fact of multicollinearity. 
 
Table 4.2: OLS regression on (3.4*) and (3.4) 
 
Explanatory Variable Estimates 
(3.4*) 
P-Value Estimates 
(3.4) 
P-Value 
𝜷𝝅   Inflation gap 0,0995** 
[0,0312] 
0,002 0,0331 
[0,0257] 
0,202 
𝜷𝜸   GDP gap 0,1341* 
[0,0644] 
0,040 0,1148 
[0,0701] 
0,106 
𝝆𝟏   𝑖𝑡−1 1,3880** 
[0,0699] 
0,000 1,5370** 
[0,0590] 
0,000 
𝝆𝟐   𝑖𝑡−2 -0,4516** 
[0,0692] 
0,000 -0,5877** 
[0,0585] 
0,000 
𝜷𝒂   Asset prices 0,2319 
[0,1210] 
0,059 0,1434 
[0,1340] 
0,288 
𝜷𝒉   House prices 0,7304 
[1,0056] 
0,470 0,7908 
[1,1841] 
0,506 
𝜷𝒆  TCW-index -0,4335 
[0,5795] 
0,456 -0,1209 
[0,5321] 
0,820 
𝑵 80  76  
𝑹𝟐 0,979  0,974  
Notes: (1) Standard errors given in parentheses; (2) * p< 0.05; (3) ** p< 0.01; (4) N is the number of 
observations 
 
 
                                                 
1 When faced with a choice of autocorrelation or multicollinearity, we find that the latter is more favorable for our 
regressions since autocorrelation gives greater errors over time, while multicollinearity affects the size of the 
coefficients for the concerned variables. Kennedy (2008) states that multicollinearity is not a problem if the 𝑅2 of the 
regression exceed the 𝑅2 of any two independent variables. See table C in appendix. 
 18 
Table 4.2 shows the result from the regression of the Taylor model with additional variables. From 
the results in the backward-looking model we conclude that the inflation gap is significant at a one 
percent level; the GDP gap is significant at a five percent level. The interpretation of the results 
shows that the Riksbank would raise the interest rate by 0,09 percent points if the inflation 
deviation from its target increased with one percent point. An increase in interest rate by 0,13 
percent points would be the response on a one percent increase in the GDP deviation from its 
trend. None of the asset prices or TCW variables in the augmented model is significant at a five 
percent level. Also, the interest rate smoothing are the only significant variables in the forward 
looking model. 
 
4.2 Two stage least square regressions 
We assumed that the OLS would not give us the best linear unbiased estimation (BLUE) since the 
expectancies in our forecasted model would be captured in the error terms1 causing bias of the 
error term. Therefore the models (3.4*) and (3.4) were estimated with TSLS, as in previous research. 
 Table 4.3 illustrates the results from the two least square regressions. In the backward-
looking regression we find that the inflation gap and the GDP gap are significant at their attributed 
levels. This infers that the Swedish central bank reacts to changes in inflation and gross domestic 
product. An increase in inflation by one percent point will result in an increase of 0.11 percent 
points of the interest rate, slightly higher than table 4.2 (OLS). If the GDP gap changes by one 
percent point, it will result in a change of the interest rate by 0.18 percent points. The regressed 
models do not find the OMX, TCW-index or the house prices significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 𝜺𝒕 = 𝜶 +  𝜷𝝅{(𝝅𝒕+𝟒 − 𝝅
∗) − 𝑬[ (𝝅𝒕+𝟒 − 𝝅
∗) ∣ 𝛀𝒕 ]} +  𝜷𝜸(𝜸𝒕 −  𝑬[ 𝜸𝒕 ∣ 𝛀𝒕 ]) + 𝒗𝒕 
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Table 4.3: TSLS regression on (3.4*) and (3.4) 
Explanatory Variable Estimates 
(3.4*) 
P-Value Estimates 
(3.4) 
P-Value 
𝜷𝝅   Inflation gap 0,1138**  
[0,0313] 
0,0005 0,0049  
[0,0677] 
0,942 
𝜷𝜸   GDP-gap 0,1822*  
[0,0733] 
0,015 0,1567 
 [0,1148] 
0,176 
𝝆𝟏   𝑖𝑡−1 1,3549**  
[0,0749] 
0,000 1,5571** 
[0,0933] 
0,000 
𝝆𝟐   𝑖𝑡−2 -0,4159** 
[0,0681] 
0,000 -0,5980** 
 [0,0771] 
0,000 
𝜷𝒂   Asset prices 0,1751  
[0,1506] 
0,248 0,1200 
 [0,1690] 
0,480 
𝜷𝒉   House prices 0,7290  
[1,0212] 
0,477 0,7353  
[1,1094] 
0,509 
𝜷𝒆  TCW-index -0,6363  
[0,5757] 
0,272 0,1066  
[0,8045] 
0,894 
𝑵 78  74  
𝑹𝟐 0,971  0,962  
Notes: (1) Standard errors given in parentheses; (2) * p< 0.05; (3) ** p< 0.01; (4) N is the number of 
observations; (5) instruments:  𝝅𝒕−𝟏…𝟒 − 𝝅
∗, 𝜸𝒕−𝟏...𝟒, 𝒊𝒕−𝟏, 𝒊𝒕−𝟐, 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒐𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒕,𝒕−𝟏…𝟒, 𝒂𝒕−𝟏 − ?̂?, 𝒉𝒕−𝟏 −
 ?̂?, 𝒆𝒕−𝟏 − ?̅? 
 
Although, when comparing table 4.2 and 4.3 (the augmented model regressed first with OLS and 
then with TSLS), the coefficient and p-values do not change as much as expected. 
We have used instruments proposed in the earlier research for our TSLS-regression1, however we 
did not know their validity in our regressions. We performed a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test to see if 
the inflation gap and GDP gap are in fact endogenous as we presumed. For the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test, the null hypothesis is that the Inflation gap and GDP gap are endogenous. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 See Clarida (1998b); Sutherland (2015) 
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Table 4.4: Regressor endogeneity test – Inflation gap and GDP gap 
 
 Durbin score p-Value 
Model (3.4*) 
Current inflation 
1.527651 0.4659 
Model (3.4) 
Inflation forecast 
0.653858 0.7211 
 
 
As seen in table 4.4, we cannot reject the null hypothesis and therefore we conclude that the 
regressors are exogenous. A TSLS is therefore not necessary to use since our OLS model in table 
4.2 give us the best linear unbiased estimators. 
 
We also tested the models (3.4*) and (3.4), with the minor change of using the difference in the 
interest rate, Δ(interest rate). The coefficients and p-values were similar to table 4.2.1 There were 
no major changes in the significance of the variables or coefficients. This reinforces our robustness 
of the original OLS estimation. 
  
                                                 
1 See table D.1 and D.2 in appendix for comparison 
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5. Discussion 
This chapter will start of by a brief discussion of our findings. The chapter will continue by a deeper discussion of the 
TCW-index and asset price, followed by a discussion of the results regarding the back- and forward looking models 
regressed. 
 
In this paper we have investigated whether or not the Swedish central bank reacts to asset prices 
and the strength of the native currency when regulating the monetary policy. We have also 
compared the inflation and the predicted inflation four quarters ahead. As anticipated, our 
regression models found the inflation-gap and the GDP gap significant to the interest rate when 
estimated in the backward looking model. However, estimations of the forward-looking model 
showed no significance for the inflation-gap nor the GDP gap. This would suggest that the interest 
rate do not react to them, which seems odd since the main purpose of the monetary policy is to 
regulate the inflation. Another noteworthy finding is that neither model found asset prices nor the 
TCW-index significant. 
5.1 TCW and asset prices 
Since the results of the regression show that asset prices and the TCW-index are insignificant, in 
both the forward- and backward looking models, we can state that the Swedish central bank do 
not react to changes in neither of the three variables. Our results align with previous research made 
on large open economies as well as the results from Sutherland (2015) based on the Swedish official 
bank, concluding that asset prices do not belong in the reaction function. However, Bernanke & 
Getler (1999) and Siklos et al. (2004), debated in their findings that asset prices can be used as an 
instrument to help forecast the inflation.  
The TCW-index consists of different currencies, weighted with respect to the size of the trade to 
the specific country. The insignificant result of the TCW-index we obtain is interesting, since the 
exchange rate channel in the transmission mechanism is said to have a great impact on the inflation 
and affect the import and export, according to the Mundell Fleming model. However we cannot 
observe the impact on the interest rate from the exchange rate nor the export in the reaction 
function. Although, the TCW-index most likely have an indirect effect on the interest rate through 
the inflation and GDP, since the monetary base is said to be used as a tool to conduct monetary 
policy in small open economies (see Fregert & Jonung 2010). As illustrated in in Figure 2.2, an 
increase the monetary base will initially lower the interest rate. Further, the currency will depreciate 
and increase the net export. Based on this theoretical reaction, it is remarkable that we find the 
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TCW-index insignificant in our regressions. Furthermore, regarding the house prices, we find it 
odd that the variable is insignificant in all of our regressions. When the central bank want to increase 
consumption they can decrease the interest rate; hence make it more attractive to take loans. 
Mishkin (2001) argues that a decrease in the interest rate will result in lowering of the cost associated 
with financing a house, further suggesting that there is a relationship between the interest rate and 
house prices; however we cannot observe this in our regressions. 
5.2 Measurement errors 
As been noted in the results obtained from the regression of the backward- and forward-looking 
models, there is a great difference between them. We found all variables insignificant (with the 
exception of the lagged interest rate) in the forward-looking regressions, even the inflation gap and 
the GDP gap. Our interpretation is that the interest rate would not react to a change in those 
variables, which is highly unlikely. Previous research has found the inflation gap and GDP gap 
significant, confirming that the independent variables explain changes in the dependent variable 
(see Taylor 1993). The reason behind our unlikely result could be that the Swedish central bank are 
having difficulties forecasting the inflation outcome. Our calculations show that the mean of the 
inflation is 1.122 percent during the period 1995Q1 to 2015Q3. As seen in figure 2.3, the inflation 
is volatile and the mean confirm that it is not directly revolving around the target of two percent 
To the count of observations on the inflation, 64 out of 83 observations lies beneath the target of 
two percent; further, around 50 percent below the expressed marginal error of one percent, clearly 
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Figure 5.1 Inflation between 1995Q1-2015Q3, the mean of the inflation and the desirable target of two percent. 
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showing that deviation from the target has been stringent throughout the majority of the time 
period1. 
 
Comparisons of our backward- and forward-looking models show that the observed measurement 
errors in future inflation are quantifiable; concluding that The Riksbank’s prediction of the inflation 
are biased. Surely, the ability to perfectly forecast inflation and further decide on the right level of 
interest rate can be seen as an impossible task. As Crockett (2000) reasoned, external disturbances 
affect the inflation, making predictions of the inflation difficult. This might be a reason why a 
change in the interest rate does not always result in the desired outcome. Supported by the rapport 
from Konjunkturinstitutet (2013), the Riksbank have had problems with their inflation forecasting. 
We argue that if the Riksbank’s inflation forecast would have been accurate; their forecasted 
inflation would in average be the same as the future realized value of the inflation. The result we 
obtained with significant realized inflation in the current period versus the non-significant realized 
inflation four periods ahead consolidates the fact that the Riksbank has not been able to predict 
the inflationary direction without noteworthy errors. Since the current level of interest rate is 
negative, the maneuverability for the Riksbank is limited in case of any shock or great fluctuation 
in the real economy. 
 
5.3 Further research 
Previous research, conducted on large economies, found that asset prices can be used as an 
indicator of the direction for the inflation. Since Sweden is considered a small economy, it would 
be interesting to investigate whether the Swedish central bank can use the asset prices as an 
indicator of future inflation and better forecast the outcome. 
Further research on asset price growth and its effect on the variance of GDP might help controlling 
economic fluctuations that in the long run affect the inflation and, in extent, the interest rate. 
  
                                                 
1 See table E in appendix. 
 24 
6. Conclusions 
A summary of the findings in this paper will be presented. 
 
The purpose of this paper was to investigate whether or not the Swedish central bank reacts to 
asset prices and the strength of the currency, and see if the predicted inflation forecast has been 
accurate. By using the Taylor rule as a foundation to conduct forward- and backward-looking 
models, we obtained different results for the similar augmented models. The findings presented 
shows that the Swedish central bank does not react to asset prices nor the TCW-index in either the 
backward- or forward-looking models i.e. the Riksbank does not view asset prices or the strength 
of the currency as valid indicators for changes in the short term interest rate. 
Furthermore, the results of the backward- and forward-looking models showed a difference in the 
significance of the deviation of the inflation from its target and the GDP from its trend. The 
backward-looking model (uses current inflation) had significant inflation- and GDP gap. In the 
forward-looking model (using inflation one year ahead), neither the inflation gap nor the GDP gap 
was found significant, which we interpret that interest rate levels has not been optimally chosen by 
the Riksbank. Our interpretation of the different results is that the Swedish central bank is 
experiencing difficulties in forecasting the future inflation, and through erroneous interest rate 
adjustment, systematically pushed down the inflation below desired levels. 
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Appendix 
A. Unit root test 
A.1 Initial Unit root tests 
Interest rate 
Augmented Dickey-
Fuller Unit Root Test 
 t-Statistic p-value 
  -3,46955 0,0113 
Test critical values: 1% level -3,513344  
 5 % level -2,897678  
 
Inflation 
Augmented Dickey-
Fuller Unit Root Test 
 t-Statistic p-value 
  -4,056729 0,0019 
Test critical values: 1% level -3,513344  
 5 % level -2,897678  
 
GDP gap 
Augmented Dickey-
Fuller Unit Root Test 
 t-Statistic p-value 
  -6,925945 0,0000 
Test critical values: 1% level -3,51229  
 5 % level -2,897223  
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OmxSpi 
Augmented Dickey-
Fuller Unit Root Test 
 t-Statistic p-value 
  -3,003131 0,1378 
Test critical values: 1% level -4,07534  
 5 % level -3,466248  
 
House prices 
Augmented Dickey-
Fuller Unit Root Test 
 t-Statistic p-value 
  -2,985669 0,1429 
Test critical values: 1% level -4,080021  
 5 % level -3,468459  
 
TCW-Index 
Augmented Dickey-
Fuller Unit Root Test 
 t-Statistic p-value 
  -3,368741 0,0629 
Test critical values: 1% level -4,075340  
 5 % level -3,466248  
 
Commodity 
Augmented Dickey-
Fuller Unit Root Test 
 t-Statistic p-value 
  -2,65271 0,2589 
Test critical values: 1% level -4,07534  
 5 % level -3,466248  
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A.2 Unit root tests on differentiated variables 
ΔInterest rate 
Augmented Dickey-
Fuller Unit Root Test 
 t-Statistic p-value 
  -4,116332 0,0001 
Test critical values: 1% level -2,593824  
 5 % level -1,944862  
 
ΔOmxSpi 
Augmented Dickey-
Fuller Unit Root Test 
 t-Statistic p-value 
  -6,268318 0,0000 
Test critical values: 1% level -3,514426  
 5 % level -2,898145  
 
2ΔHouse prices 
Augmented Dickey-
Fuller Unit Root Test 
 t-Statistic p-value 
  -9,716707 0,0000 
Test critical values: 1% level -3,517847  
 5 % level -2,899619  
 
ΔTCW-Index 
Augmented Dickey-
Fuller Unit Root Test 
 t-Statistic p-value 
  -3,344938 0,0000 
Test critical values: 1% level -3,513344  
 5 % level -2,897678  
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ΔCommodity 
Augmented Dickey-
Fuller Unit Root Test 
 t-Statistic p-value 
  -7,278871 0,0000 
Test critical values: 1% level -4,076860  
 5 % level -3,466966  
 
B. Correlation table 
Correlation Repo Repo(-1) 
Repo(-1) 0,969210 1,000000 
Repo(-2) 0,904307 0,972210 
 
C. Augumented Taylor - no interest rate smoothing 
 
Explanatory Variable Estimates 
(3.4*) 
P-Value Estimates 
(3.4) 
P-Value 
𝜷𝝅   Inflation gap 0,5792* 
[0,2501] 
0,023 0,0831 
[0,2450] 
0,735 
 
𝜷𝜸   GDP gap -0,1828 
[0,1993] 
0,362 -0,1636 
[0,2376] 
0,493 
 
𝜷𝒂   Asset prices -0,4445 
[0,6865] 
0,519 -1,1841 
[0,7260] 
0,107 
 
𝜷𝒉   House prices 2,7398 
[2,3485] 
0,247 1,4266 
[2,9928] 
0,635 
𝜷𝒆  TCW-index -9,1568 
[5,7574] 
0,116 -7,500 
[6,6341] 
0,262 
𝑵 80  76  
𝑹𝟐 0,226  0,085  
Notes: (1) Standard errors given in parentheses; (2) * p< 0.05; (3) ** p< 0.01; (4) N is the number of observations 
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D. Regressions with Y=Interest rate and Y=ΔInterest rate 
D.1 Backward-looking Taylor rule 
     Y= Interest rate  Y= Δ(Interest rate) 
Explanatory Variable Estimates 
(3.4*) 
P-Value Estimates 
(3.4*) 
P-Value 
𝜷𝝅   Inflation gap 0,0995** 
[0,0312] 
0,002 0,0815** 
[0,0307] 
0,009 
 
𝜷𝜸   GDP gap 0,1341* 
[0,0644] 
0,040 0,1421* 
[0,0657] 
0,034 
 
𝝆𝟏   𝑖𝑡−1 1,3880** 
[0,0699] 
0,000 0,6345** 
[0,1339] 
0,000 
𝝆𝟐   𝑖𝑡−2 -0,4516** 
[0,0692] 
0,000 -0,2185* 
[0,0858] 
0,013 
 
𝜷𝒂   Asset prices 0,2319 
[0,1210] 
0,059 0,2486 
[0,1342] 
0,068 
 
𝜷𝒉   House prices 0,7304 
[1,0056] 
0,470 0,3862 
[0,8648] 
0,656 
𝜷𝒆  TCW-index -0,4335 
[0,5795] 
0,456 0,0699 
[0,6994] 
0,920 
𝑵 80  80  
𝑹𝟐 0,979  0,618  
Notes: (1) Standard errors given in parentheses; (2) * p< 0.05; (3) ** p< 0.01; (4) N is the number of observations 
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D.2 Forward-looking Taylor rule 
     Y= Interest rate  Y= Δ(Interest rate) 
Explanatory Variable Estimates 
(3.4) 
P-Value Estimates 
(3.4) 
P-Value 
𝜷𝝅   Inflation gap 0,0331 
[0,0257] 
0,202 0,0386 
[0,0255] 
0,135 
𝜷𝜸   GDP gap 0,1148 
[0,0701] 
0,106 0,1204 
[0,0702] 
0,090 
𝝆𝟏   𝑖𝑡−1 1,5370** 
[0,0590] 
0,000 0,7041** 
[0,1240] 
0,000 
𝝆𝟐   𝑖𝑡−2 -0,5877** 
[0,0585] 
0,000 -0,1585 
[0,0973] 
0,107 
𝜷𝒂   Asset prices 0,1434 
[0,1340] 
0,288 0,1716 
[0,1484] 
0,251 
 
𝜷𝒉   House prices 0,7908 
[1,1841] 
0,506 0,5182 
[1,1218] 
0,645 
 
𝜷𝒆  TCW-index -0,1209 
[0,5321] 
0,820 0,1236 
[0,6622] 
0,852 
 
𝑵 76  76  
𝑹𝟐 0,974  0,603 
 
 
Notes: (1) Standard errors given in parentheses; (2) * p< 0.05; (3) ** p< 0.01; (4) N is the number of observations 
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E. Inflation 
Inflation 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Observ. 
Cumulative 
Observ. 
Cumulative 
Percent 
[-2, -1) -1,266667 0,235702 2 2 2,41 
[-1, 0) -0,297436 0,220043 13 15 18,07 
[0, 1) 0,442738 0,306056 28 43 51,81 
[1, 2) 1,549206 0,321216 21 64 77,11 
[2, 3) 2,541667 0,232303 12 76 91,57 
[3, 4) 3,305556 0,308701 6 82 98,80 
[4, 5) 4,266667 N/A 1 83 100,00 
Total 1,122048 1,226420 83 83 100,00 
  
 
 
 
